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Abstract The Braess Paradox (BP) is a counterintuitive finding that degrading a
network that is susceptible to congestion may decrease the equilibrium travel cost for
each of its users. We illustrate this paradox with two networks: a basic network with
four alternative routes from a single origin to a single destination, and an augmented
network with six alternative routes. We construct the equilibrium solutions to these
two networks, which jointly give rise to the paradox, and subject them to experimental
testing. Our purpose is to test the generality of the BP when the network is enriched
as well as the effects of the information provided to the network users when they con-
clude their travel. To this end, we compare experimentally two information conditions
when each of the two networks is iterated in time. Under public monitoring each user
is accurately informed of the route choices and payoffs of all the users, whereas under
private monitoring she is only informed of her own payoff. Under both information
conditions, over iterations of the basic and augmented games, aggregate route choices
converge to equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Braess Paradox
The Braess Paradox (BP) (1968) is a major finding in the equilibrium analysis of route
choice in directed networks that are susceptible to congestion. It demonstrates that
degrading a network that is subject to congestion by removing one or more links may
under certain circumstances decrease the cost of travel for all its users. The BP may
be illustrated in networks modeled as non-atomic games (Roughgarden 2007) where
the number of commuters is very large and, as a consequence, each commuter only
controls a negligible fraction of the overall traffic. Alternatively, as in this study, it may
be illustrated in networks modeled as atomic routing games, where each commuter
has a non-negligible effect on the travel costs of all the other commuters. Our study
focuses on directed traffic networks with a common origin and common destination
in which each commuter imposes the same amount of traffic.
The two networks in Fig. 1 illustrate the BP. There are n commuters (n =18 in this
study) who independently have to choose a route O → D from vertex (node) O (for
origin) to vertex D (for destination), while minimizing total cost of travel. Each link
is assigned a cost function ci j ( fi j ) (also called “latency function”), which describes
the cost of travel incurred by a commuter traversing link ij as a function of the number
of commuters, fi j , who travel on the same link. For example, the cost of travel on the
route segment O → B in Fig. 1b is fixed at cO B( fO B)=210; it is not affected by
congestion. In contrast, the cost of traveling on link B → D is cB D( fB D) = 10× fB D
which does depend on congestion. The four cost functions in Fig. 1b are instances of
a linear cost function of the form ci j = a × fi j + b, where a, b ≥ 0.
Consider next the three-route network in Fig. 1a (left panel), referred to as the aug-
mented network, and assume as before that n =18. This network has five links and
three alternative routes. Travel on the link A → B is costless: cAB( f AB)=0. There is
a unique equilibrium in pure strategies where all the n =18 commuters independently
choose the route O → A → B → D (Rapoport et al. 2009). The associated cost
of travel in this equilibrium is cO A(18) + cAB(18) + cB D(18)=360. Next, remove
the link A → B to construct the two-route network in Fig. 1b (right panel), referred
to as the basic network. In the ensuing pure-strategy equilibrium for the basic net-
work, n/2 = 9 commuters choose route O → A → D and n/2 = 9 other commuters
choose route O → B → D. The equilibrium cost of travel in this structurally degraded
















Fig. 1 Basic (b) and augmented (a) networks with two alternative routes
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work by removing one of its links may improve its performance under equilibrium
flow of selfish agents.
The BP may be compared to two other well-known paradoxes in non-cooperative
game theory, namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Centipede (e.g., Aumann 1992,
1995, 1998) games. Considered jointly, these paradoxes deepen our understanding
of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium concept and the
assumptions needed to sustain it. There is a major difference between the BP and
the two other paradoxes. When the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played only once the
analysis simply shows that the equilibrium solution is inefficient. There is nothing
paradoxical about this result; Nash equilibria may not necessarily maximize social
welfare. The paradoxical result emerges when this game is played repeatedly a finite
and commonly known number of times and mutual defection on each round is derived
by backward induction (e.g., Luce and Raiffa 1957). The paradoxical result of exiting
on step 1 of the Centipede game is also derived by backward induction. In contrast
to these two games, the counterintuitive outcome of the BP results from a structural




The discovery of the BP has generated a large body of research, almost all of it the-
oretical, in communication, transportation, and computer science. Researchers have
proposed classification of networks in which the addition of one or more links could
degrade performance (Frank 1981; Steinberg and Zangwill 1983), discovered new
paradoxes (Arnott et al. 1993; Cohen and Kelly 1990; Dafermos and Nagurney 1984;
Pas and Principio 1997; Smith 1978; Steinberg and Stone 1988), proved that detecting
the BP in networks is algorithmically hard (Roughgarden 2006), and quantified the
degree of degradation in network performance from unregulated traffic (Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou 1999; Roughgarden and Tardos 2002). Almost all the existing
theoretical work on the problem of detecting and illustrating the BP has considered
networks similar to the one presented in Fig. 1a and b, other special networks, or
focused on the special case where only a single link is added to the basic network. A
notable exception is a class of Braess graphs studied by Roughgarden (2005).
Steinberg and Zangwill (1983) and Taguchi (1982) have proposed analytical con-
ditions that partially characterize whether removing a given route would improve the
equilibrium flow in a network. Those results were later generalized by Dafermos and
Nagurney (1984). On the basis of their investigation, Steinberg and Zangwill con-
cluded that the BP is a common rather than rare event. In a more recent article, Valiant
and Roughgarden (2006) considered a class of large random networks with links that
have random linear cost functions, a single origin, and a single destination. They
proved that as the number of vertices in the random network becomes very large,
the probability of detecting routes whose removal decrease travel time approaches
one.
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But is the BP a mere theoretical curiosity? As early as 20 years ago arguments were
raised against the relevance of the BP to real-life situations. The argument goes that
these are highly abstract networks and their seemingly paradoxical implications arise
from the many aspects in which they differ from reality rather than from these aspects
that they share with it (Cohen 1988). Valiant and Roughgarden have expressed a sim-
ilar sentiment in writing “However, remarkably little is known about whether the BP
is a common real-world phenomenon, or a mere theoretical curiosity” (2006, p. 2).
If the BP is a rare event in selfish routing networks, restricted to judiciously chosen
combinations of parameter values and very simple networks, then interest in it ought
to be limited. After all, there are numerous theories in the social and physical sciences
that yield curious results when applied to “pathological” cases. But if a substantial
fraction of networks in communication and transportation are susceptible to the BP,
then the problem of removing links from the augmented network or, alternatively,
adding links to the basic network gains practical significance and should, therefore,
be approached with considerable caution.
1.2.2 Empirical
On the empirical (i.e., field data) side, there has been mostly anecdotal evidence
suggesting that the BP might actually have occurred in certain road networks. In a
postscript to his exposition of the BP about 40 years ago, Murchland (1970) remarked
that Knödel had noted that, in agreement with the BP, major road improvements in the
center of the city of Stuttgart had failed to yield the benefits expected. In an article pub-
lished with the provocative title “What if they closed 42nd street and nobody noticed?”
(Kolata 1990), The New York Times also hinted at the counterintuitive consequences
of road closures. Fisk and Pallottino (1981) provided examples that occurred on a
modeled network of the city of Winnipeg and supported the BP. Additional empirical
evidence has been reported in a recent article by Youn et al. (2008), who analyzed a
large portion of the Boston road network with 246 directed links, and concluded that
the “Braess’s paradox is more than academic curiosity” (2008, p. 4).
1.2.3 Experimental
A complementary approach is to simulate traffic networks that are susceptible to the
BP (e.g., Fig. 1a and b) in the laboratory, have subjects independently choose routes
on these networks before and after one or more links are removed from the augmented
network or added to the basic network, and find out whether systematic and replicable
patterns of behavior emerge and if they do, whether they support equilibrium play. If
replicable patterns of behavior do emerge, then they may contribute to answering the
question whether the BP is a significant phenomenon of real value or, alternatively,
that it is devoid of practical interest. A major advantage of this approach is that the
assumptions underlying the BP about the constant population size, parameters of the
cost functions, and information structure can be implemented with precision. This is
not the case in field studies (Morgan et al. 2009). Another advantage is that it allows the
study of choice patterns and learning from experience by iterating the congestion game
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with the same population of users while keeping the cost functions and information
structure fixed over iterations.
Experiments designed to study the occurrence of the BP include Aoki et al. (2007);
Morgan et al. (2009), and Rapoport et al. (2006, 2008, 2009). Rapoport et al. (2009,
Experiment 1) studied the basic and augmented networks in Fig. 1b and 1a, respec-
tively. In one of their studies, subjects first chose routes in 40 iterations of the basic
network and then in 40 additional iterations of the augmented network. In a second
study, the order of presentation of the basic and augmented networks was reversed.
Rapoport et al. (2009) reported several major findings. First, the order of presenta-
tion of the two networks had no effect on the observed distribution of route choices.
Second, an important determinant of performance in the experiment was persistent
variability in traffic flow that decreased very slowly with experience. Thirdly, and
most importantly, mean route choices in the augmented network slowly converged
with experience to the pure-strategy equilibrium solution where all subjects choose
route O → A → B → D. Keeping the cost functions fixed but systematically varying
the population size (n =10, 20, 40 in three different conditions), Rapoport et al. (2006)
reported additional evidence in strong support of the BP. Statistically significant, but
weaker support for the BP was reported by Aoki et al. (2007), Morgan et al. (2009)
and Rapoport et al. (2008, 2009, Exp. 2).
1.3 Designing the present study
Two main features of the design of the previous studies critically limit their gener-
alizability. First, with the exception of Rapoport et al. (2009, Exp. 2), all of these
experiments have focused on the simple case of a basic network with only two alter-
native routes. There is a large gap between the very simple networks studied in the
laboratory (see, e.g., Fig. 1a and b) and the considerably richer networks examined
theoretically by, for example, Youn et al. Whereas equilibrium play may become trans-
parent when the network has only two routes, particularly if they are symmetric, this is
not the case in networks with more routes. The second feature has to do with the type
of monitoring at the end of each round when the network game is played repeatedly.
Real-world traffic networks are often characterized by private monitoring, where each
user only observes the traffic flow on the route segments that she actually traverses.
But in the experiments reported above (with the exception of Morgan et al.), at the end
of each round each subject was informed of the route segments chosen and associated
costs incurred by all the users (public monitoring). A major shortcoming of these
experiments resulting from the very simple structure of the networks that they imple-
mented is that the effects of private and public monitoring could not be distinguished:
even under private monitoring the information about the route choices and payoffs of
all the users could easily and accurately be deduced.
When network games are repeated in time, public and private monitoring may result
in very different dynamics. In fact, if the game is repeated in time, then the players
may find a way to deviate from the one-shot equilibrium play and collectively choose
routes that increase their payoff. We know from the folk theorem for finitely repeated
games with public monitoring that an outcome, which is better for each user than the
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Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, can be implemented as an equilibrium of the
repeated game. The folk theorem maintains that if the Nash equilibrium exceeds the
minimax payoff,1 as is the case in our design, then players can adopt many payoff
profiles in the first stage of the repeated game and maintain them by the threat of hold-
ing deviating players to their minimax payoff. No such general result exists regarding
the possibility of playing off Nash equilibrium strategies when monitoring is private
(see, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson 2006 for a survey of repeated games and variations
of the folk theorem under alternative ways of monitoring). Therefore, we will use the
one shot equilibrium as the benchmark for evaluating the choices of our subjects. The
same approach was used by Rapoport et al. and Morgan et al.
This study aims to overcome the two design shortcomings mentioned above. We
examine patterns of route choice and experimentally test equilibrium solutions in a
basic network with four (rather than two) alternative routes from a common origin to
a common destination and then add to it two (rather than one) directed route segments
resulting in an augmented network with six (rather than four) alternative routes. We
use a within-group design with the same subjects independently choosing routes in
both networks, and iterate the network games multiple times. Outcome information at
the end of each round is manipulated in a between-subject design, with two conditions.
In one condition of public monitoring each subject is fully informed at the end of each
round of the route choices and payoffs of all group members. In the second condition
of private monitoring, at the end of each round each subject is only informed of the
number of users on her own route. Information about route choices and costs of travel
of all the users may no longer be deduced if monitoring is private. Comparison of these
two conditions should reveal how the type of monitoring affects route choice. If shown
to manifest itself in a more complex network and under more stringent information
conditions, then the BP would gain vital support of its practical importance to network
design.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model used in
our study and the equilibrium solutions. Section 3 describes the experimental method.
Section 4 reports the results, and Sect. 5 discusses them. Online Appendix A collects
the proofs, and Online Appendix B presents the subject instructions.
2 Model
Figure 2 displays the two traffic networks that were presented to our subjects in
the experiment. Figure 2b (right panel) exhibits the basic network that includes four
routes with no cross roads connecting them, namely, routes O → A → D, O →
E → D, O → F → D, and O → B → D. The cost functions associated with the
segments of these routes are of three kinds: the constant cost function ci j ( fi j )=130,
which is not susceptible to congestion; the cost function ci j ( fi j ) = 10 × fi j , which is
moderately affected by congestion; and the cost function ci j ( fi j ) = 20 × fi j , which
1 In Games 2a and 2b the minimax strategy would be O → F → D or O → B → D with payoff (in our
design the payoff equals a reward of 290 minus travel cost) of −20 which is lower than the Nash equilibrium
payoff of 50 (Game 2a) or 100 (Game 2b).
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Fig. 2 Basic (b) and augmented (a) networks with four alternative routes
is more heavily affected by congestion. Routes O → A → D and O → E → D
have the same total cost functions on road segments that are arranged in opposite way.
The same holds for routes O → F → D and O → B → D.
The basic network game has multiple pure-strategy equilibria in which routes O →
A → D, O → E → D, O → F → D, and O → B → D are independently chosen
by 3, 3, 6, and 6 commuters, respectively. The multiple equilibria differ in the identity
of the players choosing each route but have the same distribution of users over the
four routes. The equilibria are Pareto unrankable. For each route, the individual cost of
travel is C =190. There is also a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which these
four routes are chosen with probability 0.157, 0.157, 0.343, and 0.343, respectively.
Under mixed-strategy equilibrium play, the expected cost of travel increases from 190
to 203.33. The upper panel of Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium solutions for the
basic network. Proofs are presented in Online Appendix A.
To construct the augmented network, two directed links were jointly added to the
basic network in Fig. 2b, namely, links A → E and B → F , both of them costless
(see Fig. 2a). Link A → E connects the heavily affected by congestion road segments
of routes O → A → D and O → E → D, and link B → F connects the two
moderately affected by congestion road segments of routes O → B → D and O →
F → D. There are multiple pure-strategy equilibria in which the original four routes
of the basic network are no longer chosen, and the two new routes O → A → E → D
and O → B → F → D are chosen by 6 and 12 commuters, respectively. The indi-
vidual equilibrium cost of travel on each of these three-segment routes increases from
C =190 to C =240, an increase of 26.3%. There is also a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which the two routes O → A → E → D and O → B → F → D are
chosen with respective probability of 0.314 and 0.686 (lower panel of Table 1). The
expected cost of travel under symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium play is 253.33.
3 Method
3.1 Subjects
One hundred and eighty undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Ari-
zona volunteered to participate in a computer-controlled decision-making experiment
for payoff contingent on their performance. Male and female students participated
in almost equal proportions. The subjects were divided into 10 groups (sessions) of
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n =18 members each. Five groups participated in the public monitoring (PUBLIC)
condition in which participants were fully informed at the end of each round of the
number of travelers on all the links and their costs of travel. Five other groups partic-
ipated in the private monitoring (PRIVATE) condition in which each participant was
only informed of the number of network users traveling on the same road segments
that she chose and the cost of travel on this route. Each session lasted about 100 min.
Excluding a $5 show-up bonus, the mean payoff across all the sessions was $15.57.
3.2 Procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted in a computerized laboratory with multiple
terminals located in separate cubicles. After entering the laboratory, each subject drew
a poker chip that determined her seating. At any point during the experiment questions
about the procedure were answered individually by the experimenter.
Each session was divided into Parts I and II. Written instructions were handed at the
beginning of each part and the subjects could read them at their own pace (see Online
Appendix B for the instructions of Condition PRIVATE). The instructions for Part I
presented and explained the augmented network game in Fig. 2a and the procedure
for choosing one of the six routes. The instructions for Part II did the same for the
basic network game in Fig. 2b. The instructions for Conditions PUBLIC and PRIVATE
only differed from each other in the description of the type of monitoring at the end of
each round. In Part I, the subjects in all the 10 sessions chose routes in the augmented
network that was repeated for 60 identical rounds. After completing Part I, they were
handed instructions for Part II and asked to choose routes in the basic network for 60
additional rounds. Each set of instructions exhibited the network, explained the cost
functions, illustrated the computation of the travel cost, and described the procedure
for choosing a route. To choose a route, the subject had to click on all the links com-
prising it. After all the 18 members of each group chose their routes, a new screen was
displayed with full information (Condition PUBLIC) presented in tabular form about
the number of participants choosing each of the routes and their payoff for the round.
In addition, the number of travelers on each link was exhibited on the network dia-
gram. In Condition PRIVATE, only information about the number of users choosing
the same route as the subject and her payoff for the round was presented.
On each round in both Parts I and II, each participant was provided with a reward
(endowment) of R =290 payoff units. Individual payoff for the round was calculated
by subtracting the travel cost from the reward. The value of R was chosen deliberately
so that, in equilibrium, a player wins 290 − 190=100 payoff units in Part II and only
290 − 240=50 units in Part I. Consequently, individual payoff in the basic network
was set to be twice as large as the payoff in the augmented network, thereby consid-
erably enhancing the effect of the BP. With the value of the reward set at R =290,
on any particular round participants could either gain or lose money. For example, if
the group were split with nine subjects choosing route O → A → E → D and nine
others choosing route O → B → F → D in the augmented network (Fig. 2a), then
nine participants would have lost 70 units each and nine others would have gained 110
units.
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The participants were paid their earnings at the end Part II. Payoffs were accu-
mulated across 12 randomly chosen rounds (six in each information condition) and
converted to money at the rate of 60 units=$1.00. The 12 payoff rounds were ran-
domly drawn in front of all the participants only after the experiment was completed
to eliminate any wealth effects. Overall, each participant in any session ended up with
a positive gain, so that the problem of overall negative earnings was not encountered.
Four features of the design warrant brief discussion. First, to eliminate reputation
effects, communication between the players was prohibited. Second, we opted for a
within-subject design in playing the basic and augmented games. If the effect of the
BP is realized under a within-subject design with the same subjects participating in
both network games, then the effect should prove much more convincing. Third, the
same reward of R =290 was assigned to each subject on each round in both parts of the
session. In general, when only costs are involved and the cost functions are all linear,
then adding a link may increase travel cost by at most 1/3 (Roughgarden and Tardos
2002). In our design, where costs are subtracted from a constant reward, the effect of
the BP is tripled.2 Fourth, we had the subjects experience the augmented network first.3
Had they played the basic network first, then avoiding routes O → A → E → D or
O → B → F → D in the augmented network might have been attributed to previous
experience. Playing the augmented network first with no prior experience negates this
possibility.4
4 Results
The results are organized in four separate sections. Section 4.1 reports the results
of tests of hypotheses about route choice behavior in Games 2a and 2b. Section 4.2
presents analyses of the mean payoff by condition across all the 120 rounds of play.
Section 4.3 focuses on individual differences. The analyses reported in Sects. 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3 jointly provide strong evidence of learning: mean frequencies of choice in
the augmented network and mean payoffs slowly converge with experience to equi-
librium. To account for these patterns of behavior and the effects of experience on
the distributions of route choice under private and public monitoring, we propose a
simple, reinforcement-based learning model in Sect. 4.4 and test its implications.
When group members repeatedly interact with one another over multiple iterations
of the stage game, the statistical unit of analysis is the group, not the individual player.
Consequently, we conduct non-parametric tests on group statistics to compare the
2 When expressed in terms of cost of travel, the move from the augmented network in Part I to the basic
network in Part II reduces the cost from 240 to 190 or by 21%. However, by subtracting the cost of travel
from a fixed reward the same change increases the profit from 50 to 100, or by 100%. This resulting effect
is three times the maximal theoretical cost increase as shown by Roughgarden and Tardos.
3 In an alternative within-subject design, participants first play the iterated basic network game in Part
I and then the iterated augmented game in Part II. This alternative design examines the effect of adding
links to the basic network rather than deleting the same links from the augmented network. Rapoport et al.
(2009) compared the two designs to each other in Games 1a and 1b and reported no significant differences
between them.
4 In Part I players could still refrain from choosing route O → A → E → D or route O → B → F → D
thereby avoiding negative consequences of the BP.
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two conditions to each other. As the number of groups in each condition is relatively
small, these tests are not powerful. Therefore, in a few cases we relax the assump-
tion of subject independence and conduct more powerful tests assuming that subjects
within group are mutually independent. In justification of this assumption, we note
that because the groups are relatively large and reputation building is not possible,
the effect of each individual player on the decisions of the other group members is
sufficiently small to safely be neglected.
4.1 Route choice
Table 2 presents the mean frequency of route choices. The upper panel presents the
results for the augmented network, and the lower panel for the basic network. In each
panel, the mean frequencies of choice are shown separately for Conditions PUBLIC
and PRIVATE, and within each condition they are displayed separately by session. For
each session and each route, the mean frequencies of route choice are computed across
all the 60 iterations of the stage game. Overall means across sessions are presented in
boldface. The bottom three rows of each panel display the pure-strategy equilibrium
solution, the W statistic of the Wilcoxon two-sided rank sum test for comparing the
two experimental conditions, and the associated significance level.
Inspection of the overall mean frequency of route choice across the five sessions
in the upper panel of Table 2 suggests no systematic differences between the two
monitoring conditions in the augmented network. Of the six statistical tests only one
resulted in a significant difference, with subjects in Condition PRIVATE choosing, on
average, route O → B → D more often (1.347) than the subjects in Condition PUB-
LIC (0.900). Analysis of the overall mean frequency of route choice across the five
sessions in the lower panel of Table 2 yielded the same conclusion for the basic net-
work. For each of the four routes, the session means for the two conditions are almost
identical. All four tests for Game 2b resulted in non-significant differences between
the two monitoring conditions. Considered jointly, the results of the 10 tests cannot
reject the null hypothesis of equality of mean route choice in Conditions PUBLIC and
PRIVATE.
We turn next to an investigation of the dynamics of route choice and tests of the
equilibrium solutions. Figure 3 exhibits the mean frequency of route choice for each
route separately and each round of play in Condition PUBLIC. Mean frequencies com-
puted across the five sessions of Game 2a are displayed in the upper panel of Fig. 3,
and mean frequencies for Game 2b in the lower panel. Recall that in the equilibrium
solution for Game 2b (lower panel) routes O → A → D and O → E → D are each
chosen by 3 players and routes O → F → D and O → B → D are each chosen
by six players. The results in Table 2 (lower panel) support this prediction (mean fre-
quency equals 5.727 and 6.107 for routes O → F → D and O → B → D and 3.087
and 3.080 for routes O → A → D and O → E → D). The lower panel of Fig. 3
exhibits no evidence for learning in Part II. This is supported by the non-significant
correlations between mean frequency of route choice and round number. They assume
the values r =0.050 (p =0.704), r =−0.003 (p =0.983), r =0.160 (p =0.222), and
r =−0.169 (p =0.198), for routes O → A → D, O → E → D, O → F → D,
and O → B → D, respectively.
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Fig. 3 Mean observed route choice across sessions by network type (Games 2a and 2b) and round of play:
Condition PUBLIC
In contrast, the mean frequencies of route choice in Game 2a (upper panel) exhibit
strong evidence of learning. The mean frequencies for the “original” four routes of the
basic network (O → A → D, O → E → D, O → F → D, and O → B → D)
decrease by a factor of 3.6 from 2.15 on round 1 to 0.60 on round 60. The mean
frequency of route O → A → E → D increases from 6.4 on round 1 to 10.6 on
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round 60 and slowly converges from below to the equilibrium solution. Similarly, the
mean frequency of route O → B → F → D increases from 3 on round 1 to 5 on
round 60.
Additional evidence for equilibrium play in Condition PUBLIC comes from an anal-
ysis of the individual, rather than aggregate, route choice on the last 10 rounds. For
each subject separately, we counted the number of times she chose route O → A →
E → D( fOAED), route O → B → F → D( fOBDF ), and any of the four original
routes of the basic network ( fother), where fO AE D + fO B DF + fother =10. Our results
show that fother =0 for 43 of the 90 subjects and fother ≤ 2 for 17 additional subjects.
Jointly taken, these results imply that the non-zero frequencies of choice of the four
routes in the last block of Game 2a are mostly due to a minority of the subjects.5 In
support of equilibrium play, the majority of the subjects abandoned the four “original”
routes and divided their choices between the two “new” routes O → A → E → D
and O → B → F → D in approximately the 1:2 ratio predicted by the equilibrium
solution.
Arguably, the most important finding of this study is exhibited in Fig. 4 that displays
the same information as Fig. 3 for Condition PRIVATE. A comparison of Figs. 3 and 4
suggests no major differences due to the type of monitoring. The only difference is that
convergence to equilibrium play is slower in Condition PRIVATE than in Condition
PUBLIC. The two conditions do not significantly differ from each other in the last
block of 10 rounds. Table 3 presents the mean frequency of route choice for rounds
51–60. The effects of learning may be observed by comparing Tables 2 and 3. With
only two exceptions (routes O → F → D and O → B → D), all the non-parametric
tests that compare the two conditions in the last block of rounds (for both Games 2a
and 2b) do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of means.
4.2 Payoffs
Public monitoring in the traffic network games is clearly detrimental; on average, the
subjects in Condition PRIVATE earned 11.3% more than the subjects in Condition
PUBLIC in Game 2a and 2.8% more in Game 2b. This occurred not only in Game 2a
where, as shown in the previous section, subjects in Condition PRIVATE exhibited a
slower rate of learning than subjects in Condition PUBLIC, but also in Game 2b where
equilibrium was already reached on the first few rounds of play in both conditions.
Table 4 presents the evidence. It displays the mean payoff across the five sessions
for Games 2a (upper panel) and 2b (lower panel). In each panel, mean payoffs are
presented for blocks of 10 rounds (i.e., rounds 1–10, 11–20, …, 51–60). The bottom
two rows of each panel show the Wilcoxon test statistic W and the associated level of
significance, p. In each panel and each block in Table 4, the mean payoff in Condition
PRIVATE is higher than the mean payoff in Condition PUBLIC. In each panel, three
of the six tests yielded significant differences between the two means. Analysis of the
overall individual payoffs supports this conclusion. For each game type separately, we
5 These subjects conceivably persisted in choosing these routes in order to signal to the other group
members to mimic their choices and thereby maximize social welfare.
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Fig. 4 Mean observed route choice across sessions by network type (Games 2a and 2b) and round of play:
Condition PRIVATE
compared the overall individual payoffs (90 in each condition) between the two con-
ditions by the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. The null hypothesis that the two groups
of subjects are drawn from the same population was rejected in Game 2a (z =−4.553,
p < 0.001) and Game 2b (z =−2.970, p < 0.01).
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Table 4 Mean payoff across sessions by network type (Games 2a and 2b), condition (PUBLIC and PRI-
VATE), and blocks of 10 rounds
Condition Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Rounds Overall Equil.
1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60
Augmented network (Game 2a)
PUBLIC 62.456 59.678 57.200 54.811 50.833 54.356 56.556 50
PRIVATE 66.956 70.256 64.900 63.767 56.333 55.389 62.933 50
W 91.0 68.0 77.0 69.5 90.5 103.0 2886.5 –
p NS 0.006 0.038 0.008 NS NS <0.001 –
Basic network (Game 2b)
PUBLIC 89.067 90.533 92.611 92.100 90.900 90.611 90.970 100
PRIVATE 90.878 92.589 93.644 94.300 94.344 95.178 93.489 100
W 87.0 80.0 94.5 78.0 72.5 61.5 2715.0 –
p NS NS NS 0.045 0.015 0.001 <0.001 –
Wilcoxon two-sided rank sum test
Figure 5 exhibits the mean payoff across the five sessions by round of play.
The top panel displays the results for Condition PUBLIC and the bottom panel
for Condition PRIVATE. The equilibrium payoffs (100 and 50 for Games 2b
and 2a, respectively) are portrayed as straight horizontal lines. Both panels show
that the mean payoffs in Game 2b approach 100 from below (they cannot
exceed 100) and the mean payoffs in Game 2a approach it from above.6 For each
condition and game type separately, we computed the Spearman correlation between
the mean payoff across the five sessions and the round number. The correlations
for Game 2a were negative and significant: r =−0.354 (p < 0.01) and r =−0.629
(p < 0.001) for Conditions PUBLIC and PRIVATE, respectively. The correlations for
Game 2b were positive and significant for Condition PRIVATE (r =0.441, p < 0.001)
but not significant for Condition PUBLIC. We repeated the same correlation analysis
for each session separately and obtained essentially the same pattern in each of the
10 sessions.7 We conclude that with experience in repeatedly playing the basic game
6 Individual payoff in the basic network (Game 2b) ranges from −200 (290–490 when all the 18 group
members choose either route O → A → D or O → E → D) to 150 (290–140 when only a single
subject chooses either route O → F → D or O → B → D). However, the mean payoff in Game 2b
cannot exceed the equilibrium payoff of 100. Individual payoff in the augmented network (Game 2a) ranges
between −200 (when all the 18 group members choose either route O → A → D or O → E → D) to
270 (290-20) when only a single subject chooses the route segments O → B, B → F , and F → D. The
mean payoff may be higher or smaller than the equilibrium payoff of 50.
7 The five correlations for Sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Game 2a of Condition PUBLIC were all negative
and assumed the values −0.461 (p < 0.001), −0.305 (p < 0.05), −0.394 (p < 0.01), −0.071 (NS), and
−0.302 (p < 0.05). The five correlations in Game 2b assumed the values −0.010 (NS), −0.039 (NS), 0.213
(NS), 0.129 (NS), and −0.068 (NS). The corresponding correlations for Condition PRIVATE were −0.423
(p < 0.001), −0.494 (p < 0.001), −0.304 (p < 0.05), −0.320 (p < 0.05), and −0.428 (p < 0.001) for
Game 2a (all negative), and 0.336 (p < 0.01), 0.247 (NS), 0.231 (NS), 0.238 (NS), and 0.009 (NS) for
Game 2b (all positive).
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Fig. 5 Mean payoff by network type (Games 2a and 2b) condition (top panel Condition PUBLIC, bottom
panel Condition PRIVATE)
subjects learn to better distribute themselves over the four routes and thereby increase
their payoffs. In contrast, repeated selfish play in the augmented network resulted in
subjects falling in the BP trap and thereby reducing their payoffs by almost a factor
of 2.
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4.3 Heterogeneous individual profiles
Figure 6 exhibits the individual profiles of the 18 players who participated in Session
4 of Condition PUBLIC. This session is typical; it is representative of the individual
profiles of route choice in the other sessions in both conditions. The horizontal axis
in each profile displays the round number and the vertical axis the six actual routes.
Each sub-graph exhibits the 60 route choices in the basic and augmented networks.
Inspection of the individual profiles reveals considerable individual differences. For
example, Player 18 never switched her route across all the 60 rounds in the basic
game (always choosing route O → B → D) and all the 60 rounds in the augmented
game (always choosing route O → B → F → D). In contrast, Players 1, 4, 9, and 10
switched their routes on almost every round in both networks. Players 6, 7, and 15
switched their routes in the augmented network much more often than in the basic net-
work. Individual profiles of route choice defy simple classification. It is then even more
surprising that this combination of heterogeneous profiles, or similar combinations in
the other sessions, converged to equilibrium play in both the basic and augmented
networks.
4.4 Learning
A major aim of this study was to test the predictive power of the pure-strategy equi-
librium solution. Consequently, our major emphasis has been on aggregate rather
than individual choice behavior. However, individual patterns of play are important
for understanding the group dynamics because learning takes place on the individual
rather than aggregate level.
Why do some network users switch their routes very frequently and others do not?
One explanation for networks with only two alternative routes is in terms of different
types of players. Selten et al. (2004) identified two types of players called myopic and
contrarians. Both of them base their decision on the route choices on round t , not on
the outcomes of earlier rounds. Myopic subjects switch from route j to route j ′ if the
payoff associated with traveling on route j ′ on round t exceeds the payoff associated
with traveling on route j on the same round. Contrarian subjects do not switch because
they believe that the number of myopic subjects is sufficiently large that staying on the
same route j on round t+1 is their best response. More generally, one may account
for switching/not switching of routes in terms of a cognitive hierarchy model (e.g.,
Camerer et al. 2004) where level 0 players are myopic, and players using K > 1 steps
of reasoning anticipate the decisions of lower-step thinkers and best-respond to the
mixture of their decisions.
An alternative explanation would be that subjects develop preference for some
routes based on their travel experience. A common way to describe this adaptive pro-
cess is by using a reinforcement learning model (e.g., Camerer and Ho 1999). Our
results suggest this type of model would better describe the observed behavior for sev-
eral reasons. First, and most importantly, in Condition PRIVATE anticipatory behavior
is not possible thus ruling out the possibility of applying most kinds of hierarchical
level thinking or at least sophisticated versions of them. The comparable behavior
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Fig. 6 Individual profiles of route choice of the subjects in Session 4 of Condition PUBLIC
patterns in both information conditions suggest that a similar adaptive model might
have been used in both. Second, in our games, a (simple) hierarchical model would
result in only four possible route distributions in the basic game and six distributions
in the augmented network (resulting from the choice of the “naïve” population seg-
ment and the consequent best responses by the higher levels). Our data present much
richer choice patterns which may be reproduced with a simple reinforcement learning
type model. Third, we observe similar correlations between individual payoff and fre-
quency of switches suggesting payoff affects (negatively) players’ tendency to switch
routes. Hereafter, we attempt to account for the observed aggregate behavior using
individual level reinforcement learning model.
To explain the dynamics of play exhibited in Figs. 3 and 4, we have searched
for a parsimonious reinforcement learning model that simultaneously accounts for
the aggregate route choice in both conditions and both networks. We chose the
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Experience-Weighted Attractions (EWA) model of Camerer and Ho (1999) because
of its generality, simplicity, and predictive success. In the EWA model, the attraction
of each strategy is updated on every round of play by the payoff gained from choosing
it. These attractions are then translated into probabilities of choosing each strategy.
For player i , let π ji (si (t), s−i (t)) denote the payoff earned by player i on trial t
for choosing strategy j , where si (t) is the strategy chosen by player i , and s−i (t) are
the strategies chosen by all other players. The reinforcement that player i attaches to
strategy j is denoted by
R ji (t) =
[










i (si (t), s−i (t)) − π0
]
,
where δ is a weight given to the strategies not chosen,8 I (x, y) is an indicator (or bias)
function which equals 1 if x = y (i.e., strategy actually chosen by the player) and 0
otherwise, and π0 is an aspiration level.9 This reinforcement is then used to update
strategy j’s attraction by
A ji (t) = A ji (t − 1) + R ji (t).
On round t+1, player i stochastically determines her route choice using a logistic
response function p ji (t + 1) = eλ·Ai j (t)/t eλ · Ai j (t), where λ is an attraction sen-
sitivity estimator.
We systematically searched for a parameter combination that best describes the
observed route choice in the two conditions and two networks.10 Figures 7 and 8
exhibit the aggregate route choice for both types of game and both information con-
ditions. The theoretical mean route choice functions in Figs. 7 and 8 closely resemble
the observed mean route choice functions in Figs. 3 and 4. They illustrate that a simple
and parsimonious reinforcement-based learning model is sufficient to account for the
major findings of this study regarding route choice. These include:
1. Converge to equilibrium behavior in the two basic networks that is reached within
a very few trials.
2. Mean route choices across the 60 rounds that approach, although never reach,
equilibrium behavior in the two augmented networks.
3. No discernible differences in mean route choice between the two information
conditions except for quicker convergence to equilibrium play in the augmented
network in Condition PUBLIC.
8 In the PRIVATE condition where players were informed only about their own payoff, δ=0 for all the
routes not chosen.
9 The original EWA model does not incorporate an aspiration level. However, Borgers and Sarin (2000)
among others have suggested including it in learning models. We set this aspiration level π0 to be the
equilibrium payoff of 100 in the basic network and 50 in the augmented network.
10 We set the initial attractions at A ji (t = 1) = (3/18) × 290 × N1, where 290 is the size of the reward(endowment) and N1 is the mean number of subjects who chose route j on round 1. We also set δ=0.5 and
λ=0.005 for all the subjects in each session.
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Fig. 7 Predicted mean route choice in Condition PUBLIC by the EWA learning model
Fig. 8 Predicted mean route choice in Condition PRIVATE by the EWA learning model
The learning functions in Figs. 7 and 8 are considerably smoother than the ones
in Figs. 3 and 4 and, therefore, do not fully capture the trial-to-trial variability in the
observed choices. An error parameter that would have increased variability could be
introduced, but we opted not to do so in order to keep the number of parameters at a
minimum.
5 Discussion
Our study is concerned with selfish routing in directed congestible networks where
each player controls a non-negligible amount of traffic. It makes two contributions of
potential importance to network design. First, we provide experimental evidence that,
in agreement with BP, degrading a fairly complex network by simultaneously remov-
ing two of its links may decrease the equilibrium cost of traversing this network for all
of its users. Support for equilibrium behavior on the aggregate, but not individual, level
is obtained in a within-subject experimental design where the same players are asked
to choose routes in the original and degraded networks. Moreover, it is obtained under
a cost structure in which the equilibrium payoff doubles in value when the network
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is so degraded. This evidence is to be contrasted with experimental studies of two
other major paradoxes in non-cooperative game theory, namely, the two-person iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the two-player Centipede game (e.g., McKelvey
and Palfrey 1992), which provide no support for equilibrium play. We attribute this
difference in results to the fact that altruism, reciprocity, and punishment that play a
major role in dyadic interaction have no effect on route choice with a relatively large
number of players in each group as in our study.
The second contribution concerns the effects of type of monitoring. We report
almost identical patterns of route choice in the original and degraded networks under
public and private monitoring. These patterns appear in each of the separate sessions.
Our analysis in Sect. 4.4 suggests that learning to play the one-shot equilibrium strategy
may take place even under private monitoring. Taken together, these two contributions
further demonstrate the robustness of the BP and its importance to network design.
Repetition of a game is known to have critical implications for the efficiency of the
equilibria. The folk theorem states that the efficient outcome of a one-shot game can
be supported as an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game, and therefore, self-
ish players may learn to choose strategies that maximize social welfare. In classical
game theory, the folk theorem requires public monitoring (e.g., Friedman 1971), but
recent study (Scarsini and Romania 2010) shows that players may learn to play in a
socially optimal way even under private monitoring. We do not observe patterns of
route choice that increase efficiency. This may be attributed to the fact that the number
of players in our experiment is too large, the number of rounds is too small, or both
to allow for spread of information in the population of players. Future experiments
with smaller number of network users or more rounds of play could examine whether
efficient route choices could be observed with experience in repeatedly playing traffic
network games susceptible to the BP.
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